{"id":4420,"date":"2021-06-24T11:39:55","date_gmt":"2021-06-24T15:39:55","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/solutionsreview.com\/backup-disaster-recovery\/?p=4420"},"modified":"2021-08-27T16:56:45","modified_gmt":"2021-08-27T20:56:45","slug":"why-enterprises-need-a-new-approach-to-data-protection","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/solutionsreview.com\/backup-disaster-recovery\/why-enterprises-need-a-new-approach-to-data-protection\/","title":{"rendered":"Why Enterprises Need a New Approach to Data Protection"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"WhyThis is part of Solutions Review\u2019s Premium Content Series, a collection of contributed columns written by industry experts in maturing software categories. In this submission, Kurt Mueffelmann of archTIS<\/a> explores why enterprises need a new approach to data protection.<\/a><\/span><\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

\"PremiumThis past June, an employee at Tesla was discovered to have exfiltrated large amounts of highly sensitive data to unknown third\u00a0parties.\u00a0For a\u00a0global\u00a0enterprise like Tesla,\u00a0whose intellectual property constitutes one of their most\u00a0prized and valued\u00a0assets, the ramifications of such a leak can have material consequences\u00a0—\u00a0both\u00a0to\u00a0their brand and their bottom line.\u00a0It\u2019s clear that businesses need a new approach to data protection.\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Of course,\u00a0Tesla is hardly alone.\u00a0Microsoft, General Electric, and Marriott are\u00a0just a few of the notable\u00a0global brands\u00a0that\u00a0have had\u00a0sensitive data intentionally or accidentally\u00a0leaked\u00a0by\u00a0trusted inside\u00a0users who had legitimate access to protected network resources.\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

One of the main reasons why these types of threats have been so challenging to protect against is due in part to the prevailing security philosophy\u00a0embraced\u00a0by most security teams today: an expansive \u2018telescope\u2019 approach\u00a0that prioritizes a holistic view of the network in order to\u00a0bolster\u00a0it\u00a0against an array of external threat actors.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>But as the examples above demonstrate, this broad\u00a0top-down\u00a0approach falls woefully short when it comes to keeping an organization\u2019s most critical asset \u2013 its sensitive data and files \u2013 fully secured. This\u00a0is why we need to re-think our current approach to data protection by\u00a0embracing\u00a0a\u00a0more granular, data-centric \u2018microscope\u2019 approach\u00a0that\u00a0embeds modern security\u00a0and access\u00a0controls\u00a0at the file level.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

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<\/a><\/p>\n<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div><\/div><\/span><\/p>\n

The Silent Threat of Insiders<\/span><\/b>\u00a0<\/span><\/h3>\n

The fact of the matter is that\u00a0sensitive information is compromised every day\u00a0by so-called \u2018trusted users.\u2019\u00a0But what exactly does \u2018trusted\u2019 mean in this context? It often\u00a0merely\u00a0implies\u00a0that the user\u00a0possesses the proper credentials or privileges to access certain network resources \u2013 however, it offers little insight into their intentions or aptitude.\u00a0This\u00a0leaves us with a number of challenging questions regarding a wide range of potential insider threat types.\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

How do you secure sensitive data when an unidentified third party compromises a trusted user\u2019s credentials? What can you\u00a0do\u00a0to ensure a sensitive file isn\u2019t inadvertently shared with someone who shouldn\u2019t have access? And how do you strike the right balance of providing contractors and other trusted third parties with the access they need to do their work without\u00a0impacting productivity?<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

While most\u00a0media headlines are focused on\u00a0data\u00a0breaches caused by hackers and other external bad actors, the threat represented by insiders \u2013 whether malicious or unintentional \u2013 needs\u00a0to be taken just as, if not more, seriously. That\u2019s due in part to the fact\u00a0they are\u00a0much\u00a0more difficult\u00a0to detect.\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>Dwell times for insiders\u00a0<\/span>are double that of other security incidents and still can average over 77 days to contain<\/span>.\u00a0In fact, only 13 percent of insider incidents were contained in less than 30 days<\/span>.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Broadly speaking,\u00a0insider threats\u00a0can be grouped into three broad buckets:\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n